[BBC List] freedom and liberty for all

[Mike Abendroth]

A Biblically based commentary on current issues that impact you

Free Will or the Bondage of the Will: 
Definitions are Critical 

Issue 92 - January / February 2006

by Bob DeWaay

 

"So then it does not depend on the man who wills or the man who runs, but on
God who has mercy." (Romans 9:16)

"Whatever the Lord pleases, He does, In heaven and in earth, in the seas and
in all deeps." (Psalm 135:6)

Questions from readers prompt the writing of many CIC articles. The most
frequently asked question that I have not addressed until now concerns free
will. I thoroughly researched this topic nearly ten years ago. The reason
for the delay is the complexity of the topic. Given, however, that the
question continues to be asked, I shall address it now.

Dear readers, be warned in advance that the irreducible complexity of the
topic will make this article difficult for many to follow. If you are a new
reader, please be patient, this is not standard fare on these pages. To help
those who have difficulty digesting philosophical arguments, I have provided
summary statements at the end of sections. Feel free to skip forward to
those summary statements if you see fit.

Please realize that free will is more of a philosophical concept than a
theological one, though it has theological implications. However, I often
see well meaning Christians misled by certain teachers who make their own
understanding of free will a test for orthodoxy. I think this is unfortunate
and confusing. If the following discussion does nothing else, it will show
you that free will is not the simple solution to many important theological
issues that many people think it is.

 


Two Definitions


I will be discussing two alternative definitions of free will. The first is
the typical definition demanded by Arminians (those who believe that a free
will choice to believe brings about salvation): "The ability to choose
between options, either of which could be actualized by the act of
choosing." The second definition was proposed by Jonathan Edwards: "The
ability to choose as one pleases." I will explain these in the pages that
follow and defend the second one. In so doing I will discuss several
problems that arise in seeking to understand free will.

 


Key Problems with Free will


Problem 1 - The Bible Does Not Directly Address Free will


Free will is assumed from passages that teach human responsibility.

As we begin our discussion we confront our most important problem: free will
is never directly addressed in the Bible. Even in passages where prophets
and others asked God why He allowed so much evil to harm the innocent, it
was not discussed. The answer was never that God was committed to the
principle of free will and determined that allowing evil was a necessary
by-product of free will.1 The will of humans is discussed in the Bible and
the New Testament has a Greek word for it, but its relative freedom of
choice is not directly discussed. To derive our understanding we have to go
by implications from other Scriptures.

One lady wrote a long letter rebuking me for not teaching free will to her
satisfaction. I asked her to provide scriptures that teach free will so I
could discuss the concept with her. She sent a long list of scriptures on
human responsibility. Her assumption was that if we are responsible we must
have free choice in the matter. 2 Many people think the same way.

If we say that in order for a person to be responsible, that person must be
perfectly able to make correct choices to obey God-it is the same as
rejecting the teaching of the Bible. The Bible teaches that humans are both
responsible for their sin and in bondage to their sin. It teaches that God's
grace is necessary to deliver us from sin. If man were free to perfectly
choose obedience, then someone other than Christ could have lived a sinless
life and escape judgment based on human merit. That idea denies Paul's
teaching in Romans 3:9-18. Also, Paul teaches in Galatians 3 that the
command to obey all of the Law or be cursed proves that those who are under
the Law are cursed. Logically, if people had the ability to obey the Law
perfectly, then it would not follow that being under the Law insured that
they would be cursed. But Paul said that it did. This provides a fatal
counterexample to any universal claim that responsibility implies ability.

Charles Finney, the 19th century revivalist championed the idea that
Biblical passages about man's moral responsibility imply complete ability to
perfectly obey God. Finney taught perfectionism and created a heretical
system of theology called "moral government." The following citation shows
Finney's belief in human ability as a "first truth" of reason:

Moral agency implies the possession of free will. By free-will is intended
the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in every instance, in
compliance with moral obligation. Free-will implies the power of originating
and deciding our own choices, and of exercising our own sovereignty, in
every instance of choice upon moral questions of deciding or choosing in
conformity with duty or otherwise in all cases of moral obligation. That man
cannot be under a moral obligation to perform an absolute impossibility is a
first truth of reason. But man's causality, his whole power of causality to
perform or do anything, lies in his will. 3

This sounds logical to the unregenerate mind; but it is not Biblical.
Finney's position is a reiteration of the Pelagian heresy. It goes so far in
the direction of human ability that even Rome anathematized it at Trent: "If
any one saith, that the grace of God, through Jesus Christ, is given only
for this, that man may be able more easily to live justly, and to merit
eternal life, as if by free-will without grace, he were able to do both,
though hardly indeed and with difficulty: let him be anathema."4 Rome also
anathematized Luther's opposite position on this, the bondage of the will:
"If any one saith, that, since Adam's sin, the free-will of man is lost and
extinguished; or, that it is a thing with only a name, yea a name without a
reality, a figment, in fine, introduced into the Church by Satan: let him be
anathema."5 Roman Catholic theology is semi-Pelagian, which it viewed as
middle ground. That means Rome taught "prevenient grace": "If any one saith,
that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without his
help, man can believe, hope, love, or be penitent as he ought, so that the
grace of Justification may be bestowed upon him: let him be anathema."6

Summary Statement
Let me summarize the three basic positions on the will of man in
relationship to ability to choose to obey God: 1) Pelagianism like that of
Finney teaches that humans are fully able to obey God without any special
work of grace. The mere presence of a command from God, they say, requires
the reality of free will ability to comply. 2) Semi-Pelagians teach that
without prevenient grace, man would not be able to respond freely to the
call to believe; but that God has already provided such grace to all humans.
"Prevenient" is an old English term that means "to go before." The
semi-Pelagian view is also synergistic-meaning that salvation and
sanctification are a cooperative effort between God and man. 3) Luther and
the other reformers taught the bondage of the will. This position,
anathematized by Rome in several canons on justification, was that all
fallen sinners are in bondage to their own sin so much so that they will not
submit to God without a prior sovereign work of God's grace. This became the
Reformation doctrine of "grace alone," also called "monergism." By this
thinking salvation is an act of God alone. I agree with Luther on this
matter.

 


This Topic is Complex


Why is this topic so complex? It is complex because the relative freedom or
bondage of the will is different for different types of people addressed in
the Bible. For example, the freedom of will that Adam and Eve had before the
Fall is surely different from the freedom or lack thereof experienced by
people born with a sin nature after the Fall.7 Also, the relative freedom of
will experienced by a regenerate person differs from an unregenerate sinner.
Furthermore, consider the uniqueness of freedom for the redeemed in heaven.
Clearly these differences are important to any discussion of the freedom or
bondage of the will as the case may be. Whatever definition of free will we
defend should account for these cases.

Most free will theology is based on philosophical considerations that are
imported to the discussion from outside the Bible. Since the Bible does not
directly discuss the meaning of "free will," the concept must be derived
from passages about human bondage to sin and human responsibility and
culpability before the Law of God. You will see this as we examine
literature on the topic. This complexity is why I find simplistic demands
for belief in "free will" inappropriate. Those who make these demands have
not provided enough information to explain what we are required to believe
to be considered orthodox in their eyes.

 


Problem #2 Defining Free will


It might be surprising to many that defining free will is controversial.
Jonathan Edwards wrote a profound work on this subject called: A Careful and
Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will
which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward
and Punishment, Praise and Blame."8 Though very laborious reading, it is the
best material I have found on this issue. While in seminary I spent a lot of
time digesting Edward's arguments so that I might understand the issue of
the relative freedom of the human will. What follows contains some of the
fruits of that effort.

I will provide an overview of Edward's reasoning and describe the process he
used to define free will. He begins by defining an act of the will: "The
faculty of the will is that faculty or power, or principle of minds, by
which it is capable of choosing: an act of the will is the same as an act of
choosing or choice."9 Edward's key premise is this: "A man never, in any
instance, wills any thing contrary to his desires, or desires any thing
contrary to his will."10 These desires are determined by a man's nature.
After contemplating Edwards' writings on this, I decided that I agree with
him.

This brings us to Edward's next consideration, the cause of acts of the
will. Are acts of the human will caused or uncaused? Philosophers often
discuss this topic. The short answer is that the only uncaused being or
thing in the universe is God. Everything else has a previous cause. To argue
that acts of the will are uncaused, says Edwards, is absurd. Then he deals
with the challenge that acts of the will are self-caused-which some have
asserted. In reality the soul determines acts of the will.11 However, when
one introduces the idea of self-determined acts of the will, one just pushes
the problem further back. Previous acts of the will determine the conditions
for future acts of the will. This creates an infinite regress that must go
back to some initial uncaused cause. Writes Edwards, "But if that first
volition is not determined by a preceding act of the will, then that act is
not determined by the will and is not free in the Arminian notion of
freedom, which consists in the will's self-determination."12 Edwards
concludes, "Thus, this Arminian notion of liberty of the will, consisting in
the will's self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and shouts itself
wholly out of the world."13 Infinite regresses are always problematic.

Summary Statement
To summarize, those who assert absolute self-determining freedom of the will
have serious problems. Dependent human beings, coming into the world with
their own desires and inclinations, will not choose contrary to their own
natures. For example, a person who utterly loathes beef liver (for whatever
reason) will not choose to eat it. Whatever it is about that person's nature
that makes him hate liver, also causes him to choose not to eat it. The
human will does not show up out of nowhere, uncaused, sovereign (to use
Finney's term for it) and fully capable of self-determination. Whatever
makes a person the way he is causes him to choose as he does.

To further summarize, asserting that acts of the will are self-caused
creates an infinite regress to some uncaused beginning. When Edwards says
that this uncaused beginning defeats the Arminian definition, he means that
their definition requires that all acts of the will are self-caused. But in
reality, there is a chain of causes that has to start somewhere and that
beginning would be somewhere other than in the will itself. This shows that
their definition does not work. Edwards demolishes the idea of self-caused
acts of the will and to my thinking does so validly.

 


Further Discussion of Self-determination


Norman Geisler argues for self-determination when he states: "Sooner or
later those proposing this argument will have to admit that a free act is a
self-determined act that is not caused by another."14 Geisler claims to
resolve the problem by saying a person is the cause of his acts of the will.
This view grants sinners who are dependent of something outside of
themselves (God) for their own existence the power of self-determination
through choices that are somehow disconnected from their own nature and
their previous choices. Geisler includes in his doctrine of
self-determination, "the ability to choose the opposite."15 This ability is
essential to the typical Arminian definition of free will and was refuted by
Edwards. Later we will show that this definition does not fit God, the holy
angels, or the redeemed in heaven; all of whom we know to be free.

Edwards fully anticipated what he called "evasions" such as those offered by
Geisler.16 Having established that acts of the will are choices, and these
choices arise from the human soul, Edwards argues that they are still
caused, not uncaused. Edwards wrote, "To say it is caused, influenced and
determined by something and yet not determined by any thing antecedent,
either in order of time or nature, is a contradiction."17 Pushing the cause
back from the will to the moral agent does not resolve the problem. What
causes the moral agent to choose as he does? Geisler asserts full
self-determination-the person is the sole cause of his own choices. This
would mean that humans have the ability to escape from their own natures,
desires, consequences of previous choices, and every other influence that
causes them to choose as they do and with sovereign will-power make
self-determined choices.

In my opinion, Geisler is using a semantic slight of hand to try to assert
at one and the same time that human choices are caused and uncaused. Edwards
refuted those who did the same in his day.18 Geisler claimed that the human
soul being the cause of free choices was the only cause necessary; so did a
writer in Edward's day. Here is Edward's rebuttal: "The activity of the soul
may enable it to be the cause of effects; but it does not at all enable or
help it be the subject of effects that have no cause, which is the thing
this author supposes concerning acts of the will."19 The soul making a
choice is not pristine (sovereignly free to choose any option whatsoever
without bias, reason or motivation) and unaffected previous causes.

Luther also argued strongly against the type of philosophy espoused by
Geisler in our day and others in Luther's day:

[T]hat is, a man void of the Spirit of God, does not evil against his will
as by violence, or as if he were taken by the neck and forced to it, in the
same way as a thief or cut-throat is dragged to punishment against his will;
but he does it spontaneously, and with a desirous willingness. And this
willingness and desire of doing evil he cannot, by his own power, leave off,
restrain, or change; but it goes on still desiring and craving. And even if
he should be compelled by force to do any thing outwardly to the contrary,
yet the craving will within remains averse to, and rises in indignation
against that which forces or resists it.20

Luther's view was central to the Reformation and the very view anathematized
by Trent. Geisler's apparently semi-Pelagian view is very much like Rome's.
Geisler also asserts synergism (that salvation is a cooperative effort
between God and man).21 This is also a rejection of a key doctrine of the
Reformation and certainly is a rejection of "grace alone." Luther wrote,
"And hence it follows, that 'Free-will,' without the grace of God is,
absolutely, not FREE; but, immutably, the servant and bond-slave of evil;
because, it cannot turn itself unto good."22 I agree with Luther and Edwards
that choices are caused by the nature and desires of the person choosing.
Only God's grace can change that, not some supposed principle of
self-determination.

Summary Statement
The soul of the person determines what the person chooses. A person chooses
according to what appears the most desirable. What appears most desirable is
determined by the nature of the person holding the desires. When Norman
Geisler and other Arminians23 claim that choices are self-determined and
need no other cause, they are dissociating the choice from the nature of the
person making it. However, the "self" that chooses is not sovereign and
self-caused, only God is that. The reason Arminians argue for
self-determination and choices that are self-caused is that they want to
argue that fallen sinners are free to choose to obey God in spite of their
sin nature. Luther and Edwards show that the sinner chooses sin because it
is his nature to do so.

 


More on Defining Free will


We still need further discussion about the definition of free will. Edwards
next dealt with the Arminian objection that there can be a state of
indifference in the soul out of which the will is able to sovereignly
choose. Edwards dealt with that by pointing out that if the will does make a
choice, at that point of choice it cannot be called "indifferent." Edwards
wrote, "Choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference,
than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderation of the
scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium."24 He called a choice
made out of total indifference a "contradiction" and "absurdity," thus
rejecting a definition proposed by some Arminians in his day.25

Edwards, after lengthy argumentation, offers a definition of an act of the
will: "[E]very act of the will is some way connected with the understanding,
and is as the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has already
been explained; namely, that the soul always wills or chooses that which, in
the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all
that belongs to it, appears most agreeable."26 Citing Arminian objections to
this principle which seek to disassociate acts of the will from the
understanding in order to make them fully "free," Edwards charges them with
inconsistency:

And if so, in vain are all the applications to the understanding, in order
to induce to any free virtuous act; and so in vain are all instructions,
counsels, invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and persuasives
whatsoever; for these are but applications to the understanding, and a clear
and lively exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view. But if,
after all, the will must be self-determined, and independent on the
understanding, to what purpose are things thus represented to the
understanding, in order to determine the choice.27

So if total, undetermined, sovereign freedom of choice, disconnected from
previous causes or states of the soul is the great good of the universe as
asserted by some Arminians -- then why try to convince people to change
their minds and make different choices? Doing so shows a belief that the
state of a person's mind or soul determines their choices, which is the very
doctrine that Edwards asserted and Arminians reject.

Having established that an uncaused act of the will is impossible and that
pushing the cause back to the human soul does not alleviate the problem,
Edwards concludes: "And as it is in a manner self-evident, that there can be
no act of will, choice, or preference of the mind, without some motive or
inducement, something in the mind's view, which it aims at, seeks, inclines
to, and goes after; so it is most manifest, there is no such liberty in the
universe as Arminians insist on; nor any such thing possible or
conceivable."28

Summary Statement
To summarize Edward's argument thus far: 1) All acts of the will have
causes. 2) Acts of the will arise from the human soul according to its own
desires and nature. 3) Acts of the will are determined by whatever appears
most desirous at the moment by the person choosing.

 


By the Arminian Definition of Freedom, God Would Not Be Free


A key problem with the type of definition of freedom espoused by theologians
like Norm Geisler in our day, and others in Edwards' day, is that it cannot
apply to God Himself and other moral agents such as holy angels and the
redeemed in heaven. This is a problem because the definition they propose
demands the ability to choose the contrary-when there is such a choice
between options, either one could be actualized. They argue for this
definition on this basis: it is the only definition that makes moral agents
praiseworthy or blameworthy (remember that Edwards used the terms "praise
and blame" in his long title). Why do they make this claim? They assume that
if a moral agent had no option but to do good or to do evil, that agent
could not be praised or blamed for what exists as a matter of necessity.
They would consider that as foolish as blaming a leopard for having spots.

Again, Edwards takes on this argument in a full and compelling manner. The
simple form of Edwards' rebuttal is that God Himself, because of His own
perfect, holy and virtuous nature, cannot be anything but holy and just. The
Bible says "God cannot lie."29 Since the Arminian definition of freedom
requires the real option of choosing the contrary, God is not "free" because
His nature determines that He must be truthful. Likewise, if this definition
were to hold, God would not be praiseworthy for His holy virtues because the
real possibility of choosing and actualizing the contrary does not exist for
God.

I cannot resist the opportunity to share with my readers some vintage
Edwards, including his aversion to periods:

So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy God, who always
used to be esteemed by God's people not only virtuous, but a Being in whom
is all possible virtue, and every virtue in the most absolute purity and
perfection, and in infinitely greater brightness and amiableness than in any
creature: the most perfect pattern of virtue, and the fountain from whom all
others, virtue is but as beams from the sun; and who has been supposed to
be, on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be
esteemed, loved, honored, admired, commended, extolled, and praised, than
any creature: and he who is thus every where represented in Scripture; I
say, this Being, according to this notion of Dr. Whithy, and other
Arminians, has no virtue at all: virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an
empty name; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise; because he is
under necessity, he cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no
thanks to him for it.30

Since this common Arminian definition of freedom logically leads to an
absurdity (according to Edwards) it must be rejected.

It could be argued that the term "freedom" when predicated of God is not the
same as when predicated of a human being. This, of course, is true of other
attributes of God. When it is said that God is holy, it is not univocally
the same as saying an angel is holy, or a person who is saved is holy. But
there is a valid analogical relationship that still holds. God as being God,
is holy according to his order of being; holy angels, though created and
deriving their holiness from God, nevertheless are holy as is fitting for
their order of being.

Therefore, freedom that a person has is analogically related to freedom that
God has. For example, consider the redeemed in heaven. We know that the
redeemed in heaven are free from sin. Let us apply the Arminian definition
of freedom of the will to the redeemed in heaven. Are they fully able to
choose between options, either of which could be actualized in reality?
Being informed by the Bible that the redeemed shall have the type of
holiness necessary for living perfectly in God's presence for all eternity,
we have to answer that they will not have the freedom to choose the
contrary. There is no real chance the redeemed in heaven will ever choose to
sin. This being the case, the aforementioned definition of freedom would not
apply to the redeemed in heaven either.

Edwards also argued that if it is countered that God is indeed worthy of
praise though He is necessarily holy and upright, but that humans have to
make themselves praiseworthy through free choices, then man has a greater
claim to esteem and commendation than God does.31 This too is absurd.
Edwards puts forth many similar examples and arguments, including the
holiness of Christ in His incarnation, to show that the Arminian definition
of free will is untenable and fails to account for what we know to be true
from the Scriptures. He also deals with the obverse of this: that sinners
must be able to choose not to sin if they are to be blamed for their own
evil. He gives many examples from the Scripture that sinners such as Judas
who are given over to sin through the judgment of reprobation, are
nevertheless blameworthy for their sinful condition.32

Luther argued that the only truly free being in the universe is God. Wrote
Luther, "It now then follows, that free-will is plainly a divine term, and
can be applicable to none but the divine Majesty only: for He alone 'doth,
(as the Psalm sings), what He will in Heaven and earth.'"33 Most certainly
we need a definition of free will that applies to the one truly free being
in the universe!

D. A. Carson claims that a definition of free will that includes the ability
to actualize the contrary possibility is not compatible with God's
sovereignty. Carson writes, "If its [free will's] essence is the absolute
power to contrary, a logical contradiction is entailed when this absolute
power to contrary is coupled with a divine providence which in some sense
foreordains all things with certainty."34 Carson concludes that the
definition that requires the "absolute power to the contrary" cannot be
maintained in light of the Biblical material he discusses.35

Summary Statement
I will not labor any longer over this point that Edwards makes so well. The
definition of freedom of the will that requires the real ability to choose
the contrary and the possibility of that contrary choice being actualized
fails to account for what is stated in the Bible. If a reprobate sinner is
powerless to choose holiness and virtue, his sin is still blameworthy. If
the righteous in heaven have no desire or opportunity to choose sin and
evil, their holy estate is still praiseworthy. The same goes for God Himself
and the holy angels. If Satan has neither desire, opportunity, nor ability
to choose good and virtue, Satan is still blameworthy for his evil. If
humans born after the nature of Adam had no opportunity to choose to be born
sinless, they are nevertheless blameworthy for their sin. I make these
statements in light of what we know the Bible teaches. Since the definition
of freedom that Arminians typically assert fails to account for these
realities, the definition must be rejected.

 


A Simple Alternative


Edward's proposed a most simple solution to this debate. He proposed a
simple definition of freedom: "the ability to do as one pleases." He states
this fact: "The plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty,
in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to
do as he pleases."36 He pointed out the obvious fact that "freedom" is
something a person who has a will has, not something the will itself has:
"That which has the power of volition or choice, is the man or the soul, and
not the power of volition itself."37 So if a person has the opportunity to
choose whatever seems best to him, he is thereby freely exercising his
volition.

Summary Statement
Edwards' simple definition of freedom of the will is the ability to choose
as one pleases. This definition, along with the definition that a person
chooses according to his greatest desire at the moment, resolves the many
problems that the Arminian definition created. Now, God is free because He
freely chooses all that is holy and virtuous from His perfectly holy nature.
The same goes for holy angels and the redeemed in heaven. Likewise all other
moral agents are free to choose as they see fit, including the wicked.

 


The Underlying Concern


Why would anyone reject this simple solution? The answer lies in certain
theological priorities. If this definition is accepted, then it would follow
that no sinner would ever choose to come to God on His terms: "because the
mind set on the flesh is hostile toward God; for it does not subject itself
to the law of God, for it is not even able to do so; and those who are in
the flesh cannot please God" (Romans 8:7, 8). If this be true, then Luther's
position against Rome that salvation is fully an act of God is true because
the dead sinner is not about to cooperate in his own salvation. This idea is
as repulsive to many evangelicals today as it was to the Roman Catholic
Church when Luther first taught it. But what really matters is what the
Bible says.

 


Implications


Free will is not the simple answer to important theological questions that
people think it is. It raises more questions and complications than it
answers. I set about to study this matter in great detail over ten years
ago. I read the best material I could find, much of it sited in this
article. The bottom line for me is that we need to accept what the Bible
teaches and not try to escape from clear Biblical passages through
philosophical speculation. I am not minimizing the sincere desire people
have to answer the difficult question about God's relationship to time,
evil, and human choices. But I am saying that outside of Divine revelation
in Scripture there are true mysteries.

People, for example, want to know why Adam and Eve sinned. The doctrine of
free will that many cherish is deemed the obvious answer. I would affirm
that Adam and Eve freely chose to rebel against God. Some suggest that this
proves God's ultimate commitment to the principle of self-determination. But
the Bible does not teach that God is committed to a principle of creaturely
self-determination that explains the whole history of sin and redemption. If
God left all sinners the full power of self-determination, then all would be
damned. We need to be delivered by God out of our self-determined course on
the road to hell.

But, back to the question, why did Adam and Eve sin? Let's push the question
back further. Why did God allow the Serpent into the Garden? Why did not God
utterly destroy Satan when he first rebelled? The Bible does not say.
Whatever is not revealed is a mystery, and the answers to the last two of
these questions are mysteries.

How could it be that Adam and Eve, being created good by a good God, chose
to do evil? Doesn't that violate Edward's definition of choosing what one
desires? The real question from Edwards' perspective would be: Where did
Adam and Eve get such a desire, being innocent? They obviously had the
desire or they would not have acted on it. Since the Bible only explains
this in terms of the Serpent enticing Eve to question God's word, we must
accept that answer. What is not revealed is rightly described as "mystery."

Some argue that if God could have kept Adam and Eve from sinning He would be
morally obligated to do so. He did not, so obviously God was incapable of
keeping Adam and Eve from sinning because if He did He would have violated
the right of self-determination of the creature. Do you realize how many
unbiblical presumptions this thinking involves? Where does the Bible say God
is morally obligated to keep His creatures from sinning if He has the power
to do so? That is a philosophical premise that is not taught in Scripture.
Where does the Bible teach that God has obligated Himself to the principle
of the creature's right to self-determination? That is a philosophical
premise that is not taught in Scripture. Where does the Bible assert that
evil is due to some inability in God to prevent it? It does not; that is
philosophical speculation not taught in Scripture.

I am not saying that it is wrong to ask philosophical questions and to seek
their answers. I am saying that it is wrong to demand that other Christians
believe what one teaches under pains of being declared heretical or
unbiblical based on philosophical questions not raised or answered in
Scripture. That is precisely what prompted me to write this article. At the
very least, consider what the Bible teaches:

Just as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we
should be holy and blameless before Him. In love He predestined us to
adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the kind
intention of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace, which He
freely bestowed on us in the Beloved. (Ephesians 1:4-6)

Would it not be kind and charitable to allow Christians to literarily
believe what this says without being forced to redefine it based on
someone's philosophical speculations?

 


Conclusion


I share this discussion to further demonstrate how exceedingly complex the
discussion of free will is when engaged in from a philosophical perspective.
I want to emphasize again, this is a philosophical discussion about matters
that the Biblical writers appeared to be unconcerned about. Secular writers
and philosophers often address the issue of free will. For example, consider
the following from Stephen Hawking, the famous scientist who wrote A Brief
History of Time:

Of course, you could say that free will is an illusion anyway. If there
really is a complete theory of physics that governs everything, it
presumably also determines your actions. . . . So one way to look at it is
that we say humans have free will because we cannot predict what they do.
However, if a human goes off in a rocket ship and comes back before he set
off, we will be able to predict what he will do because it will be part of
recorded history. Thus in that situation, the time traveler would not in any
sense have free will.38

Philosophers advance a similar argument only concerning God's foreknowledge.
If God foreknows all things, then all things have been certain since before
the foundation of the world. Somewhere we have to leave off philosophical
speculation and accept the testimony of Scripture. I appreciate D. A.
Carson's appeal to Scripture and suggestion that it teaches both Divine
sovereignty and human responsibility.

I am bemused when I hear Arminians suggesting that so-called "Calvinists"
are always bringing philosophical considerations to the table. What they do
not realize is that their free will idea is philosophical. Philosophers with
no interest in theology discuss it constantly. Conversely, monergism and
synergism are purely theological issues. Secular philosophers have no
concern whether salvation is an act of God alone, or a cooperative effort
between man and God.

Edwards' simple definition of free will gives us a great starting point to
discuss the matter of God's grace in salvation. If everyone is free to
choose according to his or her own desires and nature, then how does a
sinner choose to come to God on His terms? The answer has to do with God's
sovereign grace.

We need to decide between the Roman Catholic doctrine of synergism, and the
doctrine of "grace alone" taught by the Reformation. This debate centers on
the issue of human ability or human inability as the case may be. The next
CIC article will explore issues about salvation and whether it is an act of
God, or a cooperative effort. I will further defend the idea that the whole
human being, including the faculty of the will, is in bondage to sin and
death and is incapable of extracting himself out of it. Salvation is an act
of God alone.

 

  _____  





End Notes

1.	See Bob DeWaay; The Hebrew Lament and the Problem of Evil; Critical
Issues Commentary issue 64: http://cicministry.org/commentary/issue64.htm
<http://cicministry.org/commentary/issue64.htm%22> 
2.	The passages she cited are: Genesis 3:17; Genesis 4:17; Hosea 8:4;
John 15:6; Romans 2:28; Romans 8:7, 8 (which is ironic since these verses
teach human inability); Romans 11:19; and John 3:16. None of these passages
directly mention the human will.
3.	Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology, Lecture 2 "Conditions for
Moral Obligation" 25, from Books For The Ages, AGES Software, version 8.0
[CD-ROM] (Rio WI: The Master Christian Library Series, 2000).
4.	Council of Trent, Canons on Justification, Canon II.
5.	Council of Trent, Canons on Justification, Canon V.
6.	Council of Trent, Canons on Justification, Canon III.
7.	Pelagius denied that the sin nature was passed down from Adam to his
descendents. http://www.passionforgrace.org.uk/doctrine3.html
8.	This was written in 1754 and is usually referred to as "The Freedom
of the Will."
9.	Jonathan Edwards A Careful and Strict Inquiry . . ., from Books For
The Ages, AGES Software, version 8.0 [CD-ROM] (Rio WI: The Master Christian
Library Series, 2000). 8.
10.	Ibid. 10.
11.	Ibid. 37.
12.	Ibid. 38.
13.	Ibid. 39.
14.	Norman Geisler, Chosen But Free - A Balanced View of Divine
Election, (Bethany House: Minneapolis, 1999) 177. 
15.	Ibid. 176.
16.	I have benefited greatly by many of Norman Geisler's books and
teachings. That I am disagreeing with him on this point should not be taken
to mean I do not appreciate and respect Geisler, because I do. However, in
Chosen But Free his theological prejudices appear to cloud is usual logical
brilliance.
17.	Edwards, 40.
18.	Here is how he shows their contradictions: "If there be an act of
the will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the will
is determined by another; and so we have the absurdity of every free act,
even the very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no
act or exercise of the will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is
exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that no liberty
consists in the will's power to determine its own acts; or, which is the
same thing, that there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a
self-determining power of the will." Ibid. 41. 
19.	Ibid. 51.
20.	Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, (Baker: Grand Rapids, 1976)
72, 73.
21.	Geisler, 233.
22.	Luther, 75.
23.	Geisler denies he is an Arminian and calls himself a "moderate
Calvinist." Calvinists nevertheless consider his doctrine Arminian. I am
calling him that because of his defense of synergism.
24.	Edwards, 67.
25.	Ibid. 72.
26.	Ibid. 76.
27.	Ibid. 82, 83.
28.	Ibid. 95.
29.	Titus 1:2
30.	Edwards, 131.
31.	Ibid.
32.	Ibid. 147, 148.
33.	Luther, 76. The passage he cites is this: "Whatever the Lord
pleases, He does, In heaven and in earth, in the seas and in all deeps"
(Psalm 135:6).
34.	D. A. Carson Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility - Biblical
Perspectives in Tension; (Baker: Grand Rapids, 1981; 1994 edition) 206.
35.	Ibid. 209.
36.	Luther 32.
37.	Ibid. 33.
38.	Stephen Hawking with Leonard Mlodinow, A Briefer History of Time;
(Bantam: London, 2005) 115.

 

 

Charis, 
  
Mike Abendroth 
  
"Make us choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong, and never to
be contented with half truth when whole truth can be won.  Endow us with
courage that is born of loyalty to all that is noble and worthy, that scorns
to compromise with vice and injustice and knows no fear when right and truth
are in jeopardy."

 - West Point Military Academy Cadet Prayer 

 

 <http://www.bbcchurch.org> www.bbcchurch.org 
  

 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://lists.bbcchurch.org/pipermail/bbc_list/attachments/20070119/771c148c/attachment.htm